Quote

'If the Arabs put down their weapons today, there would be no more violence. If the Jews put down their weapons today, there would be no more Israel ." Benjamin Netanyahu
First they came for the communists, and I didn't speak out because I wasn't a communist. Then they came for the trade unionists, and I didn't speak out because I wasn't a trade unionist. Then they came for the Jews, and I didn't speak out because I wasn't a Jew. Then they came for me and there was no one left to speak out for me.

Introduction

"If I bring a sword upon a land, and the people of the land take one man from among them and make him their watchman, and he sees the sword coming upon the land and blows the trumpet and warns the people, then he who hears the sound of the trumpet and does not take warning, and a sword comes and takes him away, his blood will be on his own head.... But if the watchman sees the sword coming and does not blow the trumpet and the people are not warned, and a sword comes and takes a person from them, he is taken away in his inequity; but his blood I will require from the watchman's hand." Ezekiel 33:2b-6 I have not been appointed, but I feel the weight of the watchman, because I see the sword coming. How can I not warn the people?

Yuri Bezmenov
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Friday, February 5, 2010

The Federalist Papers Critiqued Part 3

I, once again, am not the end all, tell all authority on the Federalist Papers. I heard Glenn Beck throw down the gauntlett in asking that someone interpret it in common language, and this is my attempt. I have done the first 2 chapters, if you want to look at my other blogs, this is chapter 3. Thanks for reading, I hope this makes it a bit easier.


Number 3: The Same Subject Continued (Dangers from Foreign Force and Influence) by John Jay

It's not new that people of any country, even an intelligent and well-informed country such as America, seldom adopt and can go on for years with the wrong opinion regarding their own interests. This is the reason why Americans naturally respect the high opinion and why Americans have considered it important that we have a federal government that is vested with a power, powers sufficient for the general and national purposes.

The more I investigate the reasons for the beginning of this opinion, the more I am convinced the reasons are convincing and final.

Among the many objects to which a wise and free people find it necessary to direct their attention, that of providing for their safety seems to be the first. The safety of the people leads to a great variety of circumstances and considerations, and you have to give freedom to act to those who wish to define it precisely and understandably.

Right now, I only mean to define it as the preservation of peace and tranquility, as well as against dangers from foreign arms and influence, as well as from dangers arising from domestic causes. As the former comes first in order, they will be discussed first. Let us examine whether a friendly Union, under a national government, affords them the best security that can be given against hostilities from abroad.

The number of wars which have happened or will happen will always be found to be in proportion to the number and weight of the causes, whether real or made up, which provoke them. If this is accurate, then we have to look at whether just as many wars will be started by a United America as a disunited America; for it should turn out that a united America would probably give the fewest, because it will follow that a Union would preserve the people in a state of peace with other nations.

The just causes of war, for the most part, arise either from violations of treaties or direct violence. America has already formed treaties with no less than six foreign nations, and all of them, except Prussia, are maritime, and therefore able to annoy and injure us. She has also extensive commerce with Portugal, Spain, and Britain and with respect to the two latter (Spain and Britain) being neighbors to their territories (Canada and Mexico).

It is of high importance with America that she observe the laws of nations towards all these powers, and it would be easier if she were one national government than thirteen separate States or three or four distinct confederacies. For this opinion, I can state various reasons.

Once an efficient national government is established, the best men in the country will not only consent to serve, but will be appointed to manage it. Though town or country may place men in State assemblies or senates or courts of justice or executive departments, there will be need for men of talents and other qualifications for offices under the national government. Though it is not uncommon to want for proper persons of experience in some States, we'll have the whole nation to pull from for the nation. It will result that the administration, the political counsels and judicial decisions of the national government will be more wise, systematic and judicious than the individual States and therefore more satisfactory with respect to other nations, as well as more safe with respect to us.

Under the national government, treaties will be explained in detail, and executed in the same manner, the hearing of court cases on the same points and questions in thirteen States or in three or four confederacies, will not always be consistent, or as well by a variety of independent governments from different local laws with different interests and influences. The wisdom of the convention in committing such questions to the jurisdiction and judgment of courts appointed only to one national government cannot be recommended too strongly.

It may tempt a State to swerve from good faith and justice because they will be giving up the advantage they currently hold; but those temptations, not reaching other States, and consequently having little or no influence on the national government, will be fruitless, and your good faith and justice must be preserved. The case of the treaty of peace with Britain adds great weight to this reasoning.

Even if the governing party in a State should resist such temptations, they may persist. They result from circumstances peculiar to the State and may affect the inhabitants of that State and the governing party may not always be able to prevent the injustice meditated, or punish aggressors. The national government, not being affected by local circumstances, will neither be persuaded to commit the wrong themselves, nor want the power or inclination to prevent or punish its commission by others.

So far, therefore, violations of treaties, either designed or accidental, and laws of nations afford just causes of war, they are less to be grasped under one general government than under several lesser ones, and this favors the safety of the people.

As to the just causes of war that proceed from direct and unlawful violence, it's equally clear that one good national government gives vastly more security against dangers than that which can be derived from any other source.

Such violence more frequently occur because of the passions and interests of a part, rather than a whole, of one or two States rather than a Union. Not a single Indian war has yet been produced by aggressions of the present federal government, feeble as it is, but there are several instances of Indian hostilities having been provoked by improper conduct of individual States who, either unable or unwilling to restrain or punish offenses have given occasion to the slaughter of many innocent inhabitants.

The neighborhood of Spanish and British territories, bordering on some States and not on others, causes quarrels more immediately with those border States. It might cause those States to incite war, under impulse of sudden irritation and a quick sense of apparent interest or injury; and nothing can so get rid of that danger so quickly as a national government, whose wisdom and prudence which will lower the passions and act in the interests of both parties involved.

But, not only fewer just causes of war will be given by the national government, but it will also be more in their power to accommodate and settle them by friendly means. They will be more temperate and cool, and in that respect as well as others, will be more in capacity to act with more caution than the offending State. The pride of states, as well as of men, naturally disposes them to justify their actions, and opposes their acknowledging, correcting, or repairing their errors and offenses. The national government, in such cases will not be affected by this pride, and will proceed with moderation and candor and decide on means most proper to get them out of the difficulties that threaten them.

Besides, it is well known that acknowledgments, explanations, and compensations are often accepted as satisfactory from a strong united nation, which would be rejected as unsatisfactory if offered by a State of little consideration or power.

In the year 1685, the state of Genoa, having offended Louis XIV, endeavored to appease him. He demanded that they send their Doge, or chief magistrate, accompanied by four of their senators, to France, to ask his pardon and receive his terms. They obliged to submit to it for the sake of peace. Would he on any occasion either have demanded or have received the like humiliation from Spain, or Britain or any other powerful nation?

PUBLIUS [Jay]

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