This is mighty peculiar. I went to research this event in history, found a great article by Katherine McGregor and printed it. When I went back to the Internet, it was gone. So, I want to post it here. Be advised that the links probably won't work, but I'm typing them exactly as they appear in the article. Also, it's a very long article, and I didn't save it to my computer, but printed it, so I'm typing it into the blog, not copy and pasting, so there will probably be typos. I'll try to catch them all, but it's a really long article. If you're left leaning, and you want to critique the article, keep your comments to the CONTENT, not the spelling errors. I have carpal tunnel syndrome and I get tired easily. That's why it's coming in parts. God uses our weaknesses. Also, I am not the author, so don't think you're attacking me. Take it up with Dr. Katherine McGregor. You won't find this history many other places. I found 2 other bloggers writing this stuff. Could be more, but not many. This needs to go viral. Obama was 5 when this was going on.....It would have traumatized me, had I been 5 and they were hanging members of my mom and dad's political party, mutilated, in the streets of my town.
A - Context
The 1965-1966 Indonesian killings occurred against the backdrop of the Cold War, extreme political tension and economic hardship. In 1959 President Sukarno [http://www.massviolence.org/Sukarno] implemented the system of 'guided Democracy'. He claimed that since the Indonesian revolution against the Dutch (1945-49), the system of parliamentary democracy had failed. Sukarno [http://www.massviolence.org/Sukarno] proposed an alternative in which the president would play a greater role. In addition he called for a 'return to the rails of the revolution' and began to focus increasingly on implementing the next stage of the revolution, a form of socialist populism.
During the period of Guided Democracy Sukarno[http://www.massviolence.org/Sukarno] played a delicate balancing act by supporting both the largely anticommunist army and the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI - Partai Komunis Indonesia).
The PKI was one of the few mass political forces whose influence grew during this period. By 1965 the party claimed to have three and a half million members, thereby making it the largest Communist Party in any non-communist country. The PKI offered a new modernist ideology and sought to address inequalities and generate support among the people by exploiting existing fractures in society. The PKI pressured Sukarno[http://www.massviolence.org/Sukarno] to move ahead in implementing the system of land reform. Following the government's delays in implementing land reform, based n the 1959 Crop Sharing Law and the 1960 Basic Agrarian Law, the PKI called for peasants to begin to complement their own land reforms. In regions such as East Java and parts of Bali the land reforms were a major cause of conflict.
At an ideological level there were also growing tensions resulting from the increased influence of the PKI. Although there were communist supporters in the military, the army had long standing suspicions of the PKI, based on the perception that the communists had led a rebellion against the Republic in 1948 during the struggle against the Dutch (known as the Madiun Affair). Religious groups ranging from Muslims to Catholics were also suspicious of the PKI's stance on religion, fearing that with the increasing influence of the party religious beliefs and practices would be marginalised.
Sukarno[http://www.massviolence.org/Sukarno] became increasingly strident in his condemnation of the Western powers and neo-imperialist agendas in the 1960's, culminating in the 1963-65 military operation to crush the formation of Malaysia, which in his view was a 'neo-colonial' creation.
Sukarno[http://www.massviolence.org/Sukarno] focused intensely on the ideological direction of Indonesia, paying less attention to the economy. He divided the world into NEFOS (Newly Emerging Forces) and OLDEFOS (Old Established Forces), drawing sharp lines between neo-colonial and progressive world forces.
In the late 1950's Sukarno[http://www.massviolence.org/Sukarno] had nationalized many remaining Dutch assets, emphasising the need for economic independence but producing no clear policies for the economy. This resulted in the deterioration of the infrastructure, a fall in agricultural production, escalation inflation and severe economic hardship for most Indonesians. In 1965 he famously told the US to 'go to hell' with its aid.
By 1965 rumours (sic) had begun circulating in Indonesia's capital, Jakarta, that a group of senior army generals were planning a coup against Sukarno[http://www.massviolence.org/Sukarno]. Fears intensified when Sukarno[http://www.massviolence.org/Sukarno] collapsed at an event in August due to ill health. Early in the hours of October 1, 1965, members of an armed group calling itself the 30 September Movement kidnapped and killed six of the most senior army generals and one lieutenant, dumping their corpses in an unused well at Lubang Buaya in East Jakart. the 30 September Movement was led by Lieutenant-Colonel Untung[http://www.massviolence.org/Colonel-Untung-Lieutenant] of the Cakrabirawa Presidential Guard, and was composed mostly of disaffected officers from the Central Java Diponegoro military division. The movement seized the state broadcasting service announcements proclaiming a new revolutionary government.
There are diverse interpretations as to who backed the 30 September Movement and these interpretations have a crucial bearing on the killings which followed. The official Indonesian government version of the 30 September Movement laid the blame squarely on the PKI )Pusat Sedjarah Angkatan Bersandjata, 1965). Soon after the coup attempt McVey and Anderson (1971) suggested the movement was an internal military affair in which some Communist leaders were co-opted. In the latest scholarly interpretation of the coup attempt, John Roosa (2006) demonstrated that a few top leaders of the PKI, such as the Special Bureau led by Sjam Kamaruzzaman and directed by PKI chairman D.N.Aidit[http://www.massviolence.org/N-Aidit-1923-1965-D] played a role in the coup plot, but the prior knowledge of the coup was limited to a very small circle within the pary. Some members of the affiliated PKI organizations such as the Permuda Rakyat (People's Youth) had been receiving military training and were reportedly on stand-by to mobilize for some kind of action, but they were unaware of the planned action against the military.
Suharto[http://www.massviolence.org/Suharto], then Commander of the Army Strategic Reserve, moved quickly to crush the 30 September Movement and to control interpretations of these events. The army officially declared the movement a coup attempt by the PKI. It quickly shut down Communist and other leftist publications, and pro-army papers such as Angkatan Bersendjata and Berita Ydha began to dominate the media. These army newspapers set about spreading grisly accounts of the murder of the army leaders, claiming their bodies had been mutilated prior to and after their deaths. These stories included allegations of eye gouging and genital mutilation performed by members of the Indonesian Women's Movement (Gerwani), which was closely-affiliated with the PKI. Other key elements of the army's propaganda campaign of October 1965 were the emphasis on the killing of General Nasution's daughter (her funeral was the spark that set off anti-PKI violence), and the elevation of the murdered generals to the status of 'Heroes of the Revolution'. The aim of the propaganda campaign was to inflame public opinion against the PKI, thereby leaving President Sukarno[http://www.massviolence.org/Sukarno] without a major ally.
Although there had been clashes between the PKI and its affiliated organizations, and non-communists groups before October 1965, the actions of the 30 September Movement and the accompanying propaganda campaign provided the trigger for the mass killings of 1965-66.
B. Decision-Makers, Organizers and Actors
Key Instigators - The Indonesian Army
The Indonesian army directed the killings with varying degrees of assistance from religious groups and other enemies of the PKI. they targeted members of the PKI and it's affiliated organizations, military men sympathetic to the PKI, and Sukarno[http://www.massviolence.org/Sukarno] supporters. The areas of most intense conflict were often those in which the PKI had strong political influence, for example Solo, where the Mahor was from the PKI. the violence spanned the archipelago, but was particularly intense in Java, Bali and Sumatra where the PKI had a larger following (see accompanying maps). [Note from blogger-maps didn't print.] Most of the killings took place between October 1965 and March 1966. The killings were politically motivated and in the view of some authors also motivated by related economic interests. Conflicts and resistance continued well after 1966, in some parts of Java until 1969, and many people who had either continued to resist or had gone into hiding were not arrested until this later period.
At an institutional level, the Indonesian Army had clashed seriously with the PKI previously, most notably during the 1948 Madiun Affair. The Madiun Affair involved an attempt by lower echelon Communist Party leaders, aggravated by plans to rationalise the military by left leaning troops, to seize control of the local government in Madiun from the Republican government during the war of independence from the Dutch. Anti-communist elements of the Indonesian army viewed this revolt as a great betrayal. In the 1960s there were also strong differences of opinion over the issues of how far the anti-Malaysia campaign should be taken. Proposals to arm and train peasants and workers and to increase the representation of communists in the army, in accordance with Sukarno[http://www.massviolence.org/Sukarno]'s support for representation of the three pillars of nationalism, religion and Communism in all organizations, generated significant conflict. Although these clashes in opinion could not always be expressed openly in the context of the Guided Democracy period, they nevertheless fuelled resentment towards the PKI.
Following President Sukarno[http://www.massviolence.org/Sukarno]'s refusal to ban the PKI, Suharto[http://www.massviolence.org/Suharto] dispatched the Army Para Commando Unit (RPKAD) under the leadership of Sarwo Edhie[http://www.massviolence.org/Edhie-Sarwo] to Central Java and then Bali to commence killing communists in the districts in these two provinces. In most cases the killings began when RPKAD forces arrived or when local military leaders declared that they sanctioned the killing of communists (Cribb, 2001a). In some regions military units played a major role in the killings, but they often relied on local militia. Sensationalised reporting on the deaths of the six army generals at the hands of the PKI kindled the hatred of the military men and others towards the PKI.
The Indonesian military was not, however, united in its actions and several army battalions including the Diponegoro division of Central Java and a significant number of airforce (sic) officers were in fact strongly sympathetic to the PKI.
The Nahdlatul Ulama and other Religious Organizations
The army also played a key in recruiting, arming and training militia units to carry out the killings. These militia units were largely recruited from Ansor, the youth wing of the largest Islamic organization in Indonesia, the Nahdlatul Ulama (NU - meaning awakening of the ulama or religious scholars). The army probably turned to NU because of it's extensive networks in rural communities and it's demonstrated committment to opposing communists.
In 1962 Ansor had responded to the growing assertiveness of the PKI by founding Banser (Barisan Serbaguna, or Multipurpose Brigade), an armed wing in preparation for confrontation with the PKI. Prior to the 1965 coup attempt, members of Banser had clashed physically with members of the PKI-affiliated Indonesian Farmers' Union when they attempted to seize lands owned by Islamic boarding schools as part of a broader program of land reform. In these clashes Banser was usually victorious.
In the months after the coup attempt, members of Banser mobilized, with varying degrees of military assistance and direction, and rounded up and killed members of leftist organizations.
The NU was not the only civilian organization that supported killings. the second largest Islamic organization, Muhammadiyah, also provided rapid support for crushing the PKI, with some leaders declaring this a religious duty. For both the NU and Muhammadiyah, the PKI's alleged lack of commitment to religion was a major concern.
The Catholic Party was similarly firmly anti-communist because of the perceived threat the PKI posed to religion. Secretary-general of the Catholic Party Harry Tjan Silalahi[http://www.massviolence.org/Tjan-Silalahi-Harry], was a key founder lf KAP-Gestapu (the Action Front to Crush the 30 September Movement). he helped mobilize youths from PMKRI (Persutuan Mahasiswa Katolik Republik Indonesia) to join together with Ansor in the Action Front to attack the PKI headquarters (sic) in Jakarta on October 8, 1965.
Militias attached to non-religiously aligned parties such as the Partai Nasional Indonesia (PNI - Indonesian Nationalist Party), also participated in the violence. In Bali the PNI-affilated vigilanted group Tameng Marhaen played a key role.
Explanations for the Killings
The Indonesian military's role was central in instigating and coordinating the killings, but they also relied on participation from broader sections of society. Explanations focusing on elite political rivalry, ideology, or different institutional interests do not, however, capture the reasons why people at a village level, for example, were willing to participate in the killings.
In some areas there was a strong perception that the PKI had overstepped the boundaries of acceptability with regard to the land reform actions, but also in increasingly assertive attacks on religious leaders, who were branded as one of the 'seven village devils' due to their land holdings. 'Seven village devils' was a term the PKI used in it's propaganda to denote forces deemed to be detrimental to the people's interests. In his recollections of this period Yusuf Hasyim[http://www.massviolence.org/Hasyim-Yusuf], the religious teacher and former leader of the military wing of Ansor in East Java, recalled how he had received information from the military about the existence of hit lists from the PKI of Islamic figures who were to be killed. Although these lists were probably a military fabrication, Hasyim claims that this led to a perception that there was 'only two choices: kill or be killed' (Hasyim, 2005). This is a frequent justification offered by those who participated in the killings.
In addition to local factors and specific sources of political or ideological grievance at the elite levels, the economy was in ruins and many people were struggling to survive. Cribb (2002) suggests that these dire economic conditions perhaps fueled an acceptance of the idea that the PKI were the culprits for both the failing economy and the murder of the army generals and that they should therefore be punished and prevented from coming to power.
The army encouraged a belief in the barbarity of the PKI by means of it's propaganda campaign, but it also set about training and mobilising people to take part in the arrest and killing of PKI members and those of affiliated organizations. there was also a degree of coercion in this process such that some people felt that if they did not participate they would be targeted (Sulistyo, 1997). The military thus deliberately co-opted other groups to participate in the killings. Cribb (1990) believes that they did so to ensure broad support for blocking a PKI come back and should they do so, the army would not be the only ones blamed.
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